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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the link between irregular migration and duration of stay. Using 
household and regional development data from Moldova and running a duration model, we 
find that duration of migration is longer for illegal migrants than legal migrants. Further 
investigation demonstrates that this effect is driven by significantly higher migration costs. 
From a policy perspective, our findings on irregular migration are highly relevant since they 
question the outcome of restrictive migration policies. This paper, like an increasing number 
of migration literature papers converging on the same conclusions, contributes further 
arguments for redefining migration policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, a number of developed countries have implemented political 
reforms designed to prevent or deter irregular migration while at the same time promoting regular 
temporary or permanent migration (IOM, 2004; EC, 2005). However, the fact that these attempts to 
control migration flows influence the migrant’s behaviour in terms of decision to migrate and return, 
duration of stay and the number of trips remains to be ascertained (SOPEMI-OECD, 2008). 
In this paper, we use a duration model to empirically investigate the effect of irregularity on 
the migrant’s time spent abroad. Our paper ties into a vast literature on the duration of migration. As 
highlighted by Hill (1987) and Dustmann (2003), human capital-based theories imply that assimilation 
in the host country and migration decisions are correlated over time. It is therefore more appropriate to 
base migration analysis on a dynamic model that integrates the timing factor of migration trips. The 
best way to investigate the duration and likelihood of an event occurring is to use time-to-event data. 
However, there is only a limited number of empirical analyses of return migration decisions based on 
duration models or count data models (e.g. Lindstrom, 1996; Detang-Dessendre and Molho, 1999; 
Longva, 2001; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Constant and Zimmermann, 2003; Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2011; Carrión-Flores, 2006; Bijwaard, 2010) due to the lack of reliable large-scale 
quantitative data.  
We consider the case of migrants from Moldova. This country is of particular interest, because 
it experienced high levels of mass migration and ranks first place worldwide among top remittance-
recipient countries due to one of the deepest and most prolonged economic recessions of all the 
transition countries (Ratha and al. 2007). Mid-2006 figures suggest that approximately a quarter of the 
economically-active population was occupied abroad: one in four migrants travel illegally to the host 
country, and one in three face illegal residence or employment status (Lucke et al., 2007). A large 
body of empirical research, using several microeconomic survey datasets collected in Moldova, has 
given key insight into the determinants governing migration decision, type of migration movements, 
and migrants’ remittances.1 However, there has been little research into the determinants of return 
migration and duration of labour migration from Moldova. The exceptions, which include Goerlich 
and Trebesch (2008), Pinger (2010) 2 and Borodak and Piracha (2011), suggest that temporary 
migrants represent a significant and growing share of Moldovan emigrants. According to Goerlich and 
Trebesch (2008), over 40% of Moldova’s international migrants in 2004 were temporary, whereas 
Pinger (2010) suggests the figure for 2006 was closer to 70%. Pinger (2010) uses a definition of 
                                                                 
1
 List of available datasets and surveys on Moldovan migration: Moldovan Labor Force Survey (LFS) spanning 1999-2008; Moldovan 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) spanning 1998-2008; Survey data on remittance recipient households retrieving their money at banks 2007; 
Survey of members of Savings and Credit Associations 2007; Survey on potential and returning migrants, Moldova 2006; National 
representative household surveys: “CBS-AXA 2004”, “CBS-AXA 2006” and “AMM 2003”. Shortlist of empirical research on Moldovan 
migration: Avato, 2009; Goerlich and Trebesch, 2008; Mosneaga 2007; Orozco, 2008; Hagen-Zanker and Siegel, 2007; Lücke et al., 2007; 
Parsons et al., 2007; Pinger, 2007; Cuc et al., 2005; AMM-ILO, 2004; Ghencea and Gudumac, 2004;  Pyshkina, 2002. 
2
 Goerlich and Trebesch (2008) and Pinger (2010) propose empirical studies of temporary versus permanent migration based on the “CBS-
AXA 2004” and “CBS-AXA 2006” datasets, respectively.    
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temporary migration that is based on incentives of the migrant rather than duration of migration. 
Borodak and Piracha (2011) focus on the determinants of return migration. Although all three of these 
studies shed light on the different forms of migration (seasonal, temporary, permanent, return), none of 
them have analyzed migration duration per se. 
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our work is one of the few studies 
to shed new light on the importance of legal status and costs of migration on migration duration. To 
our knowledge, there is only one other empirical study that uses a duration model to capture the effects 
of migrant legal status on duration of migration – Lindström (1996), using Mexican data –  making our 
paper only the second contribution of this type in the literature. Second, it combines individual-level 
and regional-level determinants of migration duration, as we use a unique national household dataset 
on migration collected in 2006 in Moldova, complemented with regional development indicators from 
Roscovan and Galer (2006). Few studies analyzing migration issues in transition countries integrate 
inter-regional disparities in the home countries. Fidrmuc (2004) explores the link between migration 
and regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shock in the home countries, while Coulon and Piracha 
(2005) incorporated a regional development dimension into their study on the performance of return 
migrants. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview on the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the datasets and gives descriptive statistics in terms of personal, household and 
community characteristics. Section 4 reports the results of a duration model and goes on to analyze the 
determinants of migration duration and discuss the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Framework for analysis 
Do irregular migrants return home sooner or later than their documented counterparts? Recent 
economic literature links the migrant’s legal status to migration costs. The general idea is that irregular 
migrants face higher costs of migration, earn less money, face the risk of being evicted from the host 
country, and have fewer possibilities to re-enter the country, making them more prone to stay abroad 
for longer. Hill (1987) shows that theoretically higher costs will increase mean duration of stay. In the 
same vein, Djajic and Milbourne (1988) and Lindström (1996) reported empirical results implying that 
duration of migration will decrease if migration costs decline. The evolution of border control policies 
in the 2000s, generating higher costs for potential migrants, prompted Magris and Russo (2003, 2009) 
and Constant and Zimmermann (2011) to conclude that more restrictive destination-country migration 
policies create a longer optimal duration of migration. Reichert and Massey (1984) cite this 
mechanism to explain the longer migration durations of illegal Mexican migrants to the USA. For 
Reyes (2004), longer migration is due to higher migration costs, as it takes longer for immigrants to 
achieve their targeted level of income. The pattern may also be due to the fact that illegal Mexican 
migrants earn 30% less than their legal counterparts in the United States (see Ribera-Batiz, 1999). 
These arguments all lead into our main hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 1: Irregular migrants face higher migration costs and have longer duration of 
stay.  
In order to run an empirical test on this hypothesis, we need to consider the other potential 
determinants of a migrant’s duration of stay, as highlighted in economic literature, i.e. the economic 
and social motivations that influence migrant decision at individual, household or regional levels.  
Looking at the economic factors, we focus in on wage differential effects. If we refer to the 
standard Harris and Todaro (1970) model, we can expect duration of migration to increase with wage 
differentials. Conversely, target income theory predicts duration migration to decrease with wage 
differentials: if migrants are pursuing a savings or income target, then the faster they reach it, the 
sooner they will come back (Hill, 1987; Lindström, 1996). Using micro-data for Germany, Dustmann 
(2003) expands on the hypothesis developed in Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) to empirically test 
the following hypothesis: optimal migration duration may decrease if the wage differential widens. As 
the target income theory provides the starting point for recent literature analyzing duration of 
migration, we adopt the same approach here. We then posit that: 
Hypothesis 2: Migrants reduce their migration duration in response to higher wages 
differentials between the destination and home countries. 
Since Berg (1961), the economics literature has considered regional development of the origin 
communities as a major determinant of duration of migration. However, Berg’s hypothesis, implying 
that the level of “modernity” of the origin community reduces duration of migration, has been 
challenged in the empirical literature. Lindström (1996) shows that migration duration increases with 
higher investment opportunities in the home country, as it takes more time for the migrant to reach the 
target savings. Lindström suggests that immigrants from communities with better economic 
opportunities stay longer in the United States than immigrants from economically-poor communities 
because they are saving more money to invest back home. Migrants coming from less developed areas 
have lower income and savings targets, and so return sooner. Reyes (2001) reported the same pattern 
of results for Mexican migrants. Both these arguments lead to a positive relationship between 
economic dynamism of the migrant’s origin region and duration of stay abroad. 
Hypothesis 3: Regional development in the home community has a positive impact on the 
migration duration. 
Looking at the social factors, we focus on family ties and network effects. Here, family ties 
are considered the link between the migrant and the family members who stay behind, whereas social 
networks represent the link to key knowledge and family members who have already experienced 
migration. 
Inspired by descriptive literature dating from the 1970s on migrants from Mexico to the USA, 
Hill (1987) makes the assumption that migrants have an “exogenous” preference for their home 
country: Several case studies indicate that Mexican migrants “return home because of the presence of 
family members in Mexico, a dislike of the U.S. climate, and a preference for Mexican culture and 
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life-style”. In the same vein, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) explain preference for home country by 
an attachment to the family. Attachments to family and to institutions in the home country lower the 
psychological and monetary cost of the return and raise the costs of staying abroad.  
Access to social, formal and informal networks shortens the duration of foreign trips by 
allowing migrants to diminish implicit or nonmonetary migration costs (Massey, 1990; Bauer and 
Gang, 1998; Zahniser, 1999; Palloni et al., 2001; Lindstrom and Lauster (2001); Cassarino 2004; 
Reyes, 2004; van Dalen et al. 2005). This leads into our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Migrants with stronger family ties and larger social networks move for shorter 
duration spells. 
To test our different hypotheses, we need to combine two types of dataset: a microeconomic 
dataset capturing the individual and household characteristics of migrants, and a regional-scale dataset 
that we present in the next section. 
 
3. Data description 
3.1. Data sources 
We use two datasets: the first is a national representative household survey (CBS-AXA 2006), 
while the second is a set of indicators of regional development in Moldova developed by Roscovan and 
Galer (2006). These data enable us to integrate individual, household and community characteristics 
into the Moldovan migrant model of migration duration. 
The national representative household survey was conducted in Moldova by private survey 
company CBS-AXA in July and August of 2006. The survey was commissioned by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) with the support of the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA). The survey was designed to study the impact of migration and remittances on Moldovan 
households.3 The data were collected from all 35 Moldovan regions. The total 3940 households, all 
randomly selected, generated a total sample of 14,068 people, including 3,722 (26.46%) aged between 16 
and 65 with migration experience abroad. We define migrants as people who have worked and lived away 
from home for at least one month. Return migrants are defined as people who had returned home at the 
time the survey was led. As we had no information on why the migrants came home, we have to make 
the assumption that all returns are voluntary, and thus suppose that it was an optimal choice. Near 28% 
of total migrants in our sample are returnees. For those who were still abroad at the time of the survey, the 
questions were answered by members of the family. Starting from the original sample of 3,722 adult 
migrants, a screening selection for valid answers on migration duration and legal status led us to a final 
sample of 939 migrants. Descriptive statistics on the whole adult group, the sub-sample of migrants and 
the sample used in the econometric analysis are documented in the separate appendix. The figures show 
significant differences between the groups. Hence, the sub-sample for which there was information on 
                                                                 
3
 See cf. Lücke et al. (2007) for a more in-depth look at the survey. 
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both duration of migration and legal status is not representative of the adult migrant population. The 
results of our study cannot therefore be generalized to the Moldovan migrants. 
The data on regional development in Moldova comes from Roscovan and Galer (2006). We use 
three summary indicators – i.e. economic, social and infrastructure development indexes – as proxies 
for level of regional development. A separate appendix to the paper documents the details on these data. 
 
3.2. Dependent variable 
Average duration of the migration spells is the dependent variable in this study. Of the 939 
migrants (Table 1), 48% are seasonal migrants, i.e. migrants whose duration of stay is shorter than 
three months. 72.57% are migrants who were still abroad at the time of survey (censored migrants), 
and 27.43% are return migrants.4  
Table 1 Length of stay of Moldovan migrants (duration in months). 
 All Legal experience Illegal experience 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Duration 19.96 33.64 20.23 36.40 19.02 23.84 
return migrants 6.73 7.62 5.98 5.99 9.36 11.36 
censored migrants 25.22 38.23 26.33 41.80 22.19 25.94 
Median duration  6 5 10 
return migrants 4 3 5 
censored migrants 8 6 12 
Number (%) of Observations    
return migrants 267 (28.43) 208 (29.71) 59 (24.69) 
censored migrants 672 (72.57) 492 (70.29) 180 (75.31) 
Number (%) by Duration     
less than 12 months 695 (74.01) 537 (76.71) 158 (66.11) 
13 to 24 months  69 (07.35)  36 (05.14)  33 (13.81) 
more than 24 months 175 (18.64) 127 (18.14) 48 ( 20.08) 
All Migrants: Number (%) of observations 939 (100) 700 (74.54) 239 (25.45) 
Source: CBS-AXA 2006 dataset and authors’ calculations. 
As Fig. 1 shows, the merging of late years of departure from Moldova into the survey (after 
2000) partly explains the high percentage of unreturned migrants in the dataset. 
Fig. 1 Frequency of first and last departure from Moldova per year 
 
 
                                                                 
4
 For migrants who did not report duration periods, we constructed this variable using the information available on each individual's time of 
migration, return, and number of trips. 
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If we divide the sample of movers into categories based on their length of stay abroad (Table 1), 
we find that 66% of those who had some experience of illegal migration and 76.7% of the others were 
abroad for less than a year. For those who were abroad less than two years (but more than one year), the 
proportion of migrants with undocumented migration experience is larger (13.8%) than the proportion of 
migrants with only legal experience (5%). However, these descriptive statistics are insufficient to capture 
the relationship between legal status and duration, as they include both migrants who had already returned 
to Moldova as well as migrants who had not yet finished their migration episode at the time of the survey. 
The duration model used in the next section corrects for this truncation bias and will allow us to conclude 
on the effect of legal status and other covariates on duration of stay abroad. 
 
3.3. Covariates 
In order to test our first hypothesis, three dummy variables are accessible through the CBS-AXA 
dataset to account for migrant legal status: illegal experience (25% of our sample), illegal entry in the 
destination country (21%), and illegal first job (26%). As these variables are highly correlated, we 
introduce them separately in the regressions and keep the most significant one. We also introduce a 
dummy variable that accounts for dual Romanian citizenship. Moldovan migrants holding a Romanian 
passport actually have visa-free travel rights to the EU for three months at a time. These profiles represent 
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3% of our sample, and the majority of them work in non-EU countries. In contrast, travel to 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries is generally visa-free, and the frequency of illegal 
migration to this region is low. Only 25% of migrants working in CIS countries declared that they had 
illegal experience, whereas the proportion of migrants with illegal experience in EU countries reaches the 
41% mark. Being irregular in the CIS or in the EU may well have different consequences. Therefore, in 
the empirical strategy, we introduce an interaction variable combining status and destination dummies to 
test this assumption. 
As mentioned in section 2, legal status is part of migration costs. The CBS-AXA 2006 survey 
offers a direct measure of the migration costs in the dataset: total money spent to cover migration, and 
whether the migrant needed to borrow money. Unfortunately, these questions were not routinely informed 
for our sample of 939 migrants. This prompted us to deploy a two-step econometric estimation strategy. In 
step one, we run regressions on the subsample for which we have duration and legal status data (939 
individuals), and in step two, we run estimations on the sub-sample of migrants for whom we also have 
costs and borrowing data (649 individuals). The statistics presented in Table 2 describe the link between 
legal status, migration costs, and borrowing needs. 
Table 2 Summary statistics on legal status, migration costs, and borrowing needs 
 Illegal migrants Legal migrants Total 
Borrowers (Number of observations) 73 128 201 
Mean cost of migration, US $ 1669 958 1216 
Median cost of migration, US $ 1500 150 300 
Standard deviation 1480 1395 1463 
Non borrowers (Number of observations) 109 339 448 
Mean cost of migration, US $ 879 476 574 
Median cost of migration, US $ 111 74 74 
Standard deviation 1319 1100 1169 
All (Number of observations) 182 467 649 
Mean cost of migration, US $ 1196 608 773 
Median cost of migration, US $ 290 80 100 
Standard deviation 1435 1206 1301 
 
Two main results emerge from this table. First, illegal migrants face two-fold higher migration 
costs than legal migrants (nearly 1200 US$ for illegal migrants versus 600 US$ for legal migrants). 
Second, a larger proportion of irregular migrants need to borrow to finance the trip to the destination 
country (almost 40% of illegal migrants are borrowers compared to only 27% of legal migrants). The 
combination of these facts implies that irregular migrants need to repay more for migration than legal 
migrants. 
Table 3 gives the definitions and basic descriptive statistics of the other variables used in the 
analysis. To test hypothesis 2, we need data on wages in the host and home countries, but unfortunately, 
the dataset does not contain these variables. However, like Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001), we do use 
a number of factors as proxies of the relative productivity of a particular migrant, i.e. gender, age at first 
migration trip, level of education, problems with host country language, destination, and type of location 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.15 
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abroad (rural or urban).5 Level of education before emigration and age at first migration (mean migrant 
age is 31.65) should be positively related to the migrant’s earnings potential. Conversely, women (38%) 
and migrants who do not speak the destination-country language (13%) are assumed to have a lower 
relative wage abroad. We also expect that migrants employed in an EU country (8%) would have a 
relatively higher wage abroad than a migrant working in a non-EU country. Migrants working in the CIS 
(36%) are assumed to have the lowest relative wages. Moreover, as documented in Lücke et al. (2007), 
wages are highly dependent on gender and location abroad. To capture this joint effect, we also 
introduce an interaction term between gender and destination. Furthermore, migrants working in town 
or cities (44%) in the destination country are also assumed to have higher earnings abroad. As 
Lindström (1996) suggests, compared with the agricultural sector, urban labour markets provide migrants 
with a greater variety of jobs. Three indicators relative to social, infrastructure and economic 
development (SDI, IDI and EDI) are used to test the potential impact of regional development of the 
origin community on the duration of migration (hypothesis 3). Since the levels of economic, social and 
infrastructural development are correlated, we introduce them separately in the regressions. This is 
achieved by generating dummy variables for each of these indicators, separating “depressed regions” 
from “developed regions” compared to the two main cities of Moldova.6 We also introduce dummy 
variables for the geographical zones of Moldova (Center, North and South) to account for other 
differences between regions. Finally, we use four variables as proxies for family ties (hypothesis 4): 
proportion of dependents, and the migrant’s position in the family unit (household head, spouse or child). 
Table 3 Definitions of variables and their descriptive statistics. 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Individual Characteristics     
Gender  1 if the migrant is a woman, else 0 0.38 0.49 
Age  Age at first migration trip 31.65 9.75 
Primary 1 if the migrant has no or primary education, else 0 0.36 0.48 
Tertiary 1 if the migrant has secondary or tertiary education, else 0  0.39 0.49 
University 1 if the migrant has university education, else 0  0.19 0.40 
Post-university 1 if the migrant has post-university education, else 0  0.05 0.23 
Romanian 1 if the migrant has dual Romanian citizenship, else 0  0.03 0.16 
Household Characteristics     
Dependents Proportion of dependents in the household 0.20 0.20 
Hh head 1 if the migrant is the household head, else 0  0.36 0.48 
Hh hd’s spouse 1 if the migrant is the household head’s spouse, else 0 0.18 0.38 
Hh hd’s child 1 if the migrant is the household head’s child, else 0 0.16 0.36 
Hh wealth decline 1 if the household’s subjective perception is that their wealth 
deteriorated between 1998 and 2006, else 0 
0.35 0.48 
Social Capital     
Other migrants Number of other migrants in the household  1.95 1.60 
Network 1 if the migrant received help from contacts abroad, else 0 0.62 0.49 
                                                                 
5
 Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) use two proxies to account for the relative productivity of a particular migrant: education 
before emigration and occupational class upon arrival to the host country. 
6
 See the separate appendix for more detailed information on these variables. 
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Destination Country Characteristics  
EU 1 if the migrant works in an EU country7, else 0 0.08 0.27 
CIS 1 if the migrant works in the CIS8, else 0  0.37 0.48 
Other  1 if the migrant works in other countries, else 0  0.55 0.50 
Urban destination 1 if the migrant works in an urban location, else 0 0.45 0.50 
Home Country: Community and Regional Characteristics  
Urban origin 1 if the migrant arrived from an urban location, else 0  0.30 0.46 
Locality size  1 if the migrant arrived from a locality with more than 50000 
inhabitants, else 0 
0.11 0.31 
North  1 if the migrant is arrived from the Northern region, else 0  0.28 0.45 
Centre  1 if the migrant is arrived from the Central region, else 0  0.46 0.50 
South  1 if the migrant is arrived from the Southern region, else 0  0.26 0.44 
SDI Social development index (min -1.63 and max 5) 0.63 1.83 
IDI Infrastructure development index (min -1.59 and max 1.3) 0.16 0.68 
EDI Economic development index (min -1.06 and max 2) 0.28 0.92 
Migration experience Migration experience    
Illegal exp. 1 if the migrant had illegal migration experience, else 0  0.25 0.44 
Illegal entry  1 if the migrant gained illegal entry into  the dest. country, else 0  0.21 0.41 
Illegal f. job  1 if the migrant had an illegal first job in the dest. country, else 0  0.26 0.44 
No language  1 if the migrant did not know the language of the destination 
country before migration, else 0  
0.13 0.34 
Observations Observations 939 
Households Households 762 
 
4. Analysis 
The duration models used in our analysis assume a baseline hazard function. This function 
corresponds to the hazard when all covariates are zero. Equation (1) depicts the effect of covariates on 
this hazard: 
h(t)=h0(t)µ  with µ=exp(βX)        (1) 
The intercept term h0 serves to scale the baseline hazard, X is a vector of regression covariates. 
When x=0, µ=1 and h(t)=h0.  
The corresponding survival function, i.e. the cumulated time before failure, is the following:  
S(t) = exp[-h0(t)µ]                     (2) 
In order to simplify the interpretation of the effects of the covariates on duration, the survival 
function (equation 2) is specified in accelerated failure time corresponding to a linear function 
between the natural logarithm of the survival time and the covariates: 
zxt += βln , or  )exp(zt µ=          (3) 
where t is the survival time and z is the error with density ()f . The distributional form of the error 
term determines the regression model. If we let ()f  be the normal density, the lognormal regression 
                                                                 
7
 EU countries in the CBS-AXA survey include Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  
8
 CIS countries in the CBS-AXA survey include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. 
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model is obtained. Similarly, if we let ()f  be the logistic density, the log-logistic regression is 
obtained. Setting ()f  equal to the extreme-value density yields both the exponential and the Weibull 
regression models.  
From the accelerated failure time model, it is possible to calculate time ratios (
j
i
t
t
=)exp(β ) 
which are quite similar to marginal effects and hence very convenient to interpret. 9 This is the 
presentation of the results we propose in Table 5. In model 1 for example,, the time ratio for the 
gender dummy equals 1.43. This means that duration of migration is 43% longer for a woman than for 
a man.   
Moreover, duration models allow the effect of the time already spent itself to have an effect on 
survival time. For example, we can think that when a migrant has already spent two years abroad, 
he/she is more prone to return. The Weibull function in particular allows this possibility. Its baseline 
hazard is shown through equation (4): 
h0(t)=ptp-1          (4) 
Hence, its hazard function is:  
h(t)=ptp-1µ          (5) 
and hence the corresponding survival is: 
S(t)=exp[- ptp-1µ]         (6) 
In equation (6), when p>1, the time already spent abroad decreases the duration, and when 
p<1, the time already spent abroad increases the duration. The results of the Weibull model presented 
at the bottom of Table 5 show that in our sample, time already spent abroad decreases the duration of 
migration, as the estimated p parameter is greater than one. 
Furthermore, we suspected that our sample contained unobserved heterogeneity: as time goes 
by, most returning individuals will disappear from the dataset, leaving a more homogeneous 
population comprising only those who are less likely to return home. The way to correct for this kind 
of heterogeneity is to introduce, at the level of an observation or group of observations, an 
unobservable multiplicative effect, α, on the hazard function, known as a “frailty effect”, such that:  
( | )  { ( )}  S t S t αα =           (7) 
                                                                 
9
 Quoting Jenkins (2005), note that: 
k
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=
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where S(t) is the survivor function. Since α is unobservable, we have to suppose that it follows a 
parametric distribution. Two functions are commonly used: the Gamma and the inverse Gaussian.  
As reported in Table 4, we estimate the model with all available distributions (Exponential, Weibull, 
Gompertz, Log-normal, Log-logistic and Cox) and test corrections for heterogeneity using Gamma 
and inverse Gaussian functions at individual level and household level. The most powerful model, 
with lower BIC and AIC values, is a Weibull model with a Gamma distribution for unobserved 
household heterogeneity. 
Table 4. Comparison of models for migration duration: Moldovan migrants, 2006 
 Inverse Gaussian distribution Gamma distribution 
 
AIC BIC AIC BIC 
Models with correction for unobserved household heterogeneity 
Weibull 1293.985 1376.346 1259.856 1342.218 
Exponential 1333.565 1411.082 1328.886 1406.403 
Log-logistic 1270.713 1353.075 1268.723 1351.085 
Log-normal 1316.46 1398.822 1314.411 1396.773 
Gompertz  1315.841 1398.203 1315.626 1397.988 
Cox -----a -----a -----a -----a 
Models with correction for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
Weibull -----a -----a 1289.829 1372.191 
Exponential 1341.262 1418.779 1337.943 1415.46 
Log-logistic 1286.183 1368.545 1284.534 1366.896 
Log-normal 1326.034 1408.396 1325.832 1408.194 
Gompertz  1316.186 1398.548 1316.186 1398.548 
Cox -----a -----a -----a -----a 
 
Note: a Model unable to achieve convergence 
 
Table 5 contains the results of the duration model estimations. Model 1 contains all potentially 
influential covariates. Model 2 includes only the significant variables and is used to generate the 
predictions and conclusions. Models 3 and 4 test for alternative proxies for irregular migration. Model 
5 takes into account the potential effect of being an irregular migrant in an EU country. Models 6 to 8 
introduce migration costs variables and are therefore estimated on a reduced sample (according to 
valid available data on migration costs). 
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Table 5. Time ratio estimates for duration regression models using Weibull distribution with Gamma correction for unobserved household heterogeneity.10  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender 1.43** 1.34** 1.31** 1.28*   1.37** 1.42** 1.35* 1.37**  
 (2.35) (2.20) (2.07) (1.90)    (2.37) (2.24) (1.92) (1.99)    
Age 1.03        
 (0.91)        
Age squared 1.00        
 (-1.42)        
Tertiary 1.10             
 (0.83)             
University 1.06             
 (0.38)             
Post-university 1.26             
 (0.94)             
Romanian 2.79** 2.58** 2.49** 2.41*   2.61** 2.30* 2.26* 2.15*   
  (2.21) (2.02) (1.99) (1.90)    (2.02) (1.79) (1.81) (1.71)    
Household Characteristics 
Dependents 0.44*** 0.55** 0.56** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.63* 0.74 0.76    
 (-3.06) (-2.46) (-2.49) (-2.68)    (-2.64) (-1.71) (-1.14) (-1.05)    
Hh head 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (-11.54) (-12.90) (-13.23) (-12.58)    (-12.98) (-10.46) (-7.95) (-7.69)    
Hh hd’s spouse 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (-13.25) (-13.70) (-13.91) (-13.05)    (-13.71) (-10.59) (-8.47) (-8.16)    
Hh hd’s child 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (-12.74) (-12.71) (-12.93) (-12.13)    (-12.73) (-9.25) (-7.33) (-6.92)    
Hh wealth decline 1.31** 1.35*** 1.37*** 1.38*** 1.33** 1.76*** 1.65*** 1.67*** 
  (2.33) (2.64) (2.79) (2.87)    (2.46) (4.33) (3.85) (3.93)    
Social capital                
Other migrants 1.07             
 (1.25)             
Network 1.05             
                                                                 
10
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) 
  (0.43)             
Destination Country Characteristics  
EU 1.93** 1.88*** 1.94*** 1.97*** 1.48 2.49*** 1.69* 1.75**  
 (2.02) (2.64) (2.80) (2.88)    (1.44) (3.55) (1.94) (2.06)    
CIS 0.96 0.90 0.89 0.95    0.93 0.53*** 0.58** 0.56**  
 (-0.16) (-0.61) (-0.70) (-0.28)    (-0.40) (-2.72) (-2.35) (-2.49)    
Urban destination 0.88             
  (-0.57)             
Home Country: Community and Regional Characteristics 
Urban origin 1.23        
 (1.48)        
Locality size 1.37        
 (1.27)        
Centre 0.94        
 (-0.45)        
South 0.83 0.79* 0.78** 0.83    0.80* 0.80* 0.82 0.80*   
  (-1.30) (-1.86) (-1.99) (-1.60)    (-1.76) (-1.71) (-1.59) (-1.74)    
Socially depressed 
regions 1.31* 1.20 1.21* 1.24**  1.21* 1.09 1.10 1.08    
 (1.68) (1.64) (1.76) (2.03)    (1.75) (0.75) (0.85) (0.67)    
Socially developed 
regions 0.91        
 (-0.59)        
Migration experience  
Illegal exp. 1.37** 1.37**   1.26* 1.29* 1.19 1.17 
 (2.35) (2.40)   (1.66) (1.88) (1.26) (1.16) 
Illegal entry   1.31**      
   (2.01)      
Illegal f. job   
 1.03        
   
 (0.25)        
No language 1.42* 1.43* 1.46** 1.65*** 1.47** 1.23 1.11 1.11    
 (1.87) (1.90) (2.11) (2.81)    (2.06) (1.11) (0.53) (0.56)    
EU*Gender 0.74 
(-0.80) 
 
       
CIS*Gender 0.58** 0.64** 0.66* 0.67**  0.61** 0.53*** 0.58** 0.56**  
 (-2.33) (-2.11) (-1.95) (-1.97)    (-2.29) (-2.72) (-2.35) (-2.49)    
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) Time Ratio (t) 
Illeg.status x UE     2.12*    
     (1.78)    
Costs of migration       1.00*** 1.00**  
       (4.19) (2.49)    
Borrower       0.86 0.76**  
       (-1.34) (-2.02)    
Costs x borrower       
 1.00*   
        
 (1.69)    
 Constant 93.90*** 153.80*** 151.74*** 130.34*** 151.70*** 98.67*** 72.90*** 71.70*** 
  (7.37) (20.27) (20.89) (19.27)    (20.34) (15.93) (11.74) (11.29)    
Number of obs. 935 939 955 937 939 649 649 649 
Number of households 759 762 771 757 762 547 547 547 
Number of failures  267 267 273 275 267 210 210 210 
(%) (28.43) (28.43) (28.59) (29.35) (28.43) (32.36) (32.36) (32.36) 
P 1.91*** 1.94*** 1.98*** 2.04*** 1.97*** 1.93*** 2.00*** 2.02*** 
  (8.47) (8.67) (9.36) (9.16)    (8.75) (7.56) (6.95) (6.88)    
Theta 1.99*** 2.29*** 2.36*** 2.49*** 2.34*** 1.65** 1.70* 1.75*   
  (3.24) (4.14) (4.63) (4.66)    (4.29) (1.99) (1.75) (1.82)    
chi² 235.04*** 212.66*** 222.19*** 209.51*** 215.89*** 146.41*** 167.43*** 170.39*** 
AIC 1262.55 1259.86 1277.07 1270.96    1258.63 931.43 914.40 913.44    
BIC 1407.77 1342.22 1359.72 1353.29    1345.84 1007.51 999.44 1002.95    
Notes: * prob. <0.01; ** prob. <0.005; *** prob. <0.001 
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The estimated p value shows a negative dependency of duration of stay with time already spent 
abroad.11 Figure 2 shows that it is extremely unlikely a typical Moldovan will spend more than six 
years in the host country. 
Figure 2. Weibull survival regression with Gamma household heterogeneity 
 
         Reference migrant                  Legal migrant    
 
        Illegal migrant 
 
In Figure 2, the solid line (derived by centering all of the continuous and dummy covariates on 
their respective means) represents the length of migration experienced by a typical migrant. The 
survival decreases rapidly over the first three years before flattening out abruptly at around the four-
years mark to reach roughly zero thereafter. The predicted model thus concludes that a very small 
proportion of Moldovan migrants should stay abroad after four years of migration, even if the maximal 
observed duration in our sample is 15 years.  
In Figure 2, the dashed line above the survival plot for a typical migrant is the estimated 
survival for illegal migrants. The graph highlights how illegal status in the foreign country increases 
the duration of the optimal stay.  
                                                                 
11
 For a definition of  p see above, equations (4), (5) and (6).   
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Table 6. Predicted mean and median durations at covariate sample means for return/censored and 
legal/illegal migrants 
All All Return 
migrants 
Censored 
migrants 
Nb. Obs. 939 267 672 
Predicted mean duration (months) 60.46 13.70 79.04 
Predicted median duration(months) 57.12 12.94 74.68 
Legal migrants    
Nb. Obs. 700 208 492 
Predicted mean duration (months) 52.84 12.97 69.70 
Predicted median duration (months) 49.92 12.25 65.85 
Illegal migrants    
Nb. Obs. 239 59 180 
Predicted mean duration (months) 82.78 16.28 104.58 
Predicted median duration (months) 78.21 15.39 98.81 
 
An interesting outcome of the duration models is the prediction of potential length of 
migration for censored observations (72% of migrants in model 2). According to Table 1, the 
uncompleted mean migration duration is 25 months (i.e. just over 2 years). Model 2 predicts that the 
real duration for this subpopulation should be about 5 years. The contrast is equally striking between 
illegal and legal migrants. While documented migrants have a predicted mean duration of nearly 4½ 
years, illegal migrants are likely to spend nearly seven years abroad. If illegal status is a proxy for 
more expensive migration costs, lower earnings or lower net benefits of migration, then it can explain 
this result. We test this hypothesis in the second part of the econometric analysis (Models 6 to 8 of 
Table 5). We now turn to the interpretation of the results on the whole sample. 
Model 1 rejects the influence of some potential factors. Individual characteristics such as age 
at first migration and education level do not have an effect on time spent abroad. Similarly, established 
networks have no effect on length of migration stay. Looking at destination country-focused 
characteristics, CIS and urban areas do not attract migrants for longer durations than other areas. 
Concluding on non-significant variables, migrants from the centre of Moldova and from urban regions 
do not seem to show singular patterns of migration behaviour. On the other hand, most of the 
foreseeable factors do have an influence on time spent abroad.  
Model 2 contains only significant covariates and includes a dummy variable accounting for 
illegal migration experience in the destination country (hypothesis 1). Model 3 contains a dummy for 
illegal entry into the destination country and Model 4 considers the impact of a first illegal job on 
duration of stay. Each of these potential indicators of illegality increases the time spent abroad.12 The 
most significant indicator of illegality is the dummy for illegal experience. We therefore choose to 
keep this variable for the remainder of the analysis. Model 2 is therefore our reference estimation. It 
shows that migration duration is 1.37 times higher for an illegal migrant than their legal counterpart. 
This result is consistent with Magris and Russo’s (2009) and Reichert and Massey’s (1984) 
conclusions, but runs counter to Pinger’s (2010) and Lindström’s (1996) findings. Pinger’s (2010) 
                                                                 
12
 A candidate fourth indicator could have been lack of a residence permit. We opted to ignore this variable as we suspected potential 
endogeneity with duration of migration: most of the destination countries require people to have been living in the country for a given period 
before they can apply for a residence permit.    
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empirical study on the determinants of temporary and permanent migration uses the same “CBS-AXA 
2006” dataset as used in this paper. However, Pinger uses a standard probit model to compare 
permanent versus temporary migration. Our work, which is based on duration of migration and which 
uses a parametric estimation, diverges from Pinger to demonstrate that being undocumented increases 
time spent abroad. The potential lower wage and/or higher migration costs for illegal migrants can 
partly explain this result. As irregularity can have a higher effect in the EU countries, we introduce an 
interaction variable combining illegality and EU dummy in Model 5. The results show that the 
migration duration for irregular migrants is even longer when they go to EU countries.  
Extending the investigation into the link between undocumented migrants and migration 
expenditures, Models 7 and 8 show the results after introducing migration costs and borrowing needs 
into the initial regression. Migration costs are highly significant and, as expected, the effect of legal 
status vanishes when costs are introduced into the model. Of course, to be sure that this result is not 
due to the reduced size of the sample, we re-ran the initial model without the costs on the sub-sample 
for which we have migration expenditure data (Model 6). The time ratio of the indicator on illegal 
experience (1.29) is close to that obtained on the whole sample (1.37) and is significant at a 10% risk 
rather than at a 5% risk. Therefore, the disappearance of the illegal status effect in Model 7 is not 
attributable to the reduction of sample size but to the fact that migration costs were introduced into the 
regression. The last test we run is to infer whether there are differences in the impact of migration 
expenditures between borrowers and non-borrowers. Model 8 thus includes an interaction covariate 
between migrant costs and migrant borrowers. The results show a slightly larger impact of migration 
costs for borrowers, but higher migration costs still drive longer duration of stay for non-borrowers.13 
Hence, illegal migrants come back to Moldova later than legal migrants, in part because they face 
higher migration costs.14 
From a purely statistical standpoint, Görlich and Trebesch (2008) also observed that 
undocumented migrants tend to concentrate in the seasonal-migrant sample. We ran regressions 
including a dummy variable for seasonal migrants. This factor proved significant and exerted a 
negative influence on duration without changing any of the other results. As we suspected this factor 
showed potential endogeneity since the questionnaire defined a seasonal migrant as any person having 
spent less than 3 consecutive months abroad, we removed it from the model. We also ran the model on 
the subsample of non-seasonal migrants. The main results were not different from the principal model, 
and only certain control variables were no longer significant.15  
Concerning the effect of factors used as proxies for wages differentials (hypothesis 2), we find 
that women stay longer abroad. In order to further explore the gender dimension, we introduce an 
                                                                 
13
 The precise values of the coefficients for costs are 1.000318 in Model 7 and 1.00224 in Model 8. The precise value of the coefficient for 
costs x borrower in Model 8 is 1.000225. 
14
 Illegal status could also be perceived as a proxy for lower expected wage abroad. Nevertheless, as documented further on, we introduce a 
number of other variables that can influence potential earnings in order to clear legal status for this likely influence.  
15
 These results are available upon request. 
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interaction term between destinations and gender. Women going to CIS countries come back sooner, 
whereas there is no particular effect for women going to EU. Migrants who do not know the 
destination country’s language stay longer. If gender (in particular women in CIS) and mastery of the 
foreign language were negatively correlated to expected wage, then these results would conclude in 
favour of the target income theory.  
Next, we analyze the push and pull factors of the migrant’s region of origin (hypothesis 3). 
The dataset offers three potential indicators of regional development, i.e. economic, infrastructural and 
social indexes. We introduced these indicators separately into Model 1 (results not shown). Only the 
dummy variable for socially-depressed regions was significant and subsequently kept in the analysis. 
The results show that Moldovan migrants from socially-depressed regions spend more time abroad. 
Echoing Lindström (1996) and Reyes (2001), we find that a region with better social development acts 
as a pull factor and prompts migrants to come back sooner if they can expect a better way of life in 
their home region.  
Finally, we examine the influence of family ties on duration of stay (hypothesis 4). In contrast 
with Görlisch and Trebesch (2008), we find very strong effects of household composition on the 
migrant’s duration of stay. The household head, their spouse or their child spend dramatically less 
time abroad. For example, a household head migrant or their spouse would stay only one month in the 
destination country where a typical migrant sharing otherwise identical characteristics is expected to 
spend two years in the same place. Similarly, an increasing proportion of dependent members in the 
family decreases the migrant’s duration of stay. Focusing on the influence of the family’s economic 
situation, Model 2 shows that belonging to a household that has experienced a decline in its perceived 
level of income between 1998, i.e. immediately after the Russian financial crisis, and the 2006 survey 
increases the migrant’s duration of stay. This is almost certainly due to the dependency of this type of 
family on remittances.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper investigates the factors driving migrant decisions on migration duration abroad. We 
focus on the effect of the migrant’s legal status. We run a duration model using a Moldovan micro-
survey carried out in 2006 and complemented with regional development data from Roscovan and 
Galer (2006). The estimations show that irregular migrants spend significantly longer periods abroad. 
Further investigation demonstrates that this effect is driven by significantly higher migration costs. 
From a policy perspective, our findings on irregular migration may well be highly relevant, as they 
question the outcome of restrictive migration policies. Our findings suggest that extending effective 
duration of stay compared to optimal migration duration reduces the potential circularity of migration 
episodes. The net result is that restrictive migration policies generate stocks of unmotivated illegal 
migrants in the host countries, which is ultimately the reverse effect of the stated policy goals. This 
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paper, like an increasing number of migration literature papers converging on the same conclusions 
(Constant and Zimmermann (2011) and Magris and Russo (2009) are good examples) contributes to 
further arguments for redefining migration policy. 
The estimated duration model goes on to highlight certain characteristic features of migrant 
choices. First, the more time the migrant has already spent abroad, the more prone he/she is to come 
back. Migrants presenting an unfinished migration duration spell at the time of the survey post a mean 
stay abroad of two years and seven months. According to our results, they are likely to return home 
after five more years abroad. Family composition exerts a strong pull effect on the migrant: the 
duration of stay of a household head is just 4% that of a typical migrant. The same scale of effect 
holds true for the household head’s spouse or child, as well as for the proportion of dependents in the 
family. However, we did not find any influence of networks on duration decisions. This refutes the 
findings of other studies on Moldovan migrants, including Görlich and Trebesch (2008), who, 
conversely to our study, found no evidence of influence of family ties yet a significant impact of 
networks. 
We introduce a number of proxy variables capable of influencing the wage differential 
between home and host country. Only gender increases time spent abroad, while neither age at first 
migration nor education exert any influence on duration of stay. Migration duration is 30% longer for 
women than men, except for women migrating out to the former Russian Republics, where migration 
duration will be 40% shorter than for men migrating to the same destination). These differences are 
explained by the fact that women hold different types of jobs to men in different destinations. Certain 
regional characteristics of the origin country play a significant role in the migrant’s decision. 
Moldovan emigrants from poorer regions, like Mexican emigrants –as documented by Linström 
(1996) – spend shorter spells abroad. These results may be due to the fact that income target and 
investment opportunities are lower for migrants from less-developed regions of the origin country. 
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Separate appendix to the paper 
Table 1a. Selected sample characteristics 
 
Entire sample 
(active 
population) 
Non-migrants 
sample difference Migrants sample 
Migrants 
without 
available 
duration 
information difference 
Migrants with 
available 
duration 
information 
N 10555 6.833  3722 2.787  935 
Gender 0.53 0.53 0.01 0.52 0.51 0.13*** 0.38 
Primary 0.36 0.37 0.01 0.36 0.30 -0.06** 0.36 
Tertiary 0.31 0.29 -0.05*** 0.34 0.34 -0.05* 0.39 
University 0.21 0.21 -0.01 0.22 0.26 0.07** 0.19 
Post-university 0.11 0.13 0.05*** 0.08 0.10 0.05*** 0.05 
Romanian 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Dependents 0.16 0.15 -0.03*** 0.18 0.16 -0.03** 0.20 
Hh head 0.29 0.35 0.16*** 0.19 0.11 -0.25*** 0.36 
Hh hd’s spouse 0.29 0.32 0.07*** 0.25 0.12 -0.06** 0.18 
Hh hd’s child 0.18 0.18 -0.01 0.19 0.14 -0.02 0.16 
Hh wealth decline 0.31 0.29 -0.06*** 0.35 0.28 -0.07** 0.35 
Other migrants 0.89 0.15 -2.10*** 2.24 1.57 -0.37*** 1.94 
Network 0.11 0.01 -0.31*** 0.32 0.57 -0.04 0.62 
Urban origin 0.36 0.39 0.08*** 0.31 0.32 0.02 0.30 
Locality size  0.20 0.24 0.11*** 0.13 0.15 0.04* 0.11 
North  0.27 0.26 -0.03** 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.28 
Centre  0.53 0.55 0.07*** 0.48 0.44 -0.02 0.46 
South  0.20 0.19 -0.04*** 0.23 0.27 0.01 0.26 
ecoq1 0.21 0.19 -0.06*** 0.25 0.24 -0.03 0.27 
ecoq2 0.22 0.21 -0.03** 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.22 
ecoq3 0.26 0.26 -0.01 0.27 0.27 0.01 0.27 
ecoq4 0.31 0.34 0.10*** 0.24 0.26 0.02 0.24 
socioq1 0.22 0.20 -0.03** 0.23 0.21 -0.03 0.24 
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socioq2 0.26 0.25 -0.04*** 0.29 0.30 0.01 0.29 
socioq3 0.16 0.16 -0.03*** 0.18 0.20 0.01 0.19 
socioq4 0.36 0.40 0.10*** 0.30 0.30 0.02 0.28 
infraq1 0.21 0.19 -0.04*** 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.23 
infraq2 0.25 0.25 -0.01 0.26 0.25 -0.02 0.27 
infraq3 0.18 0.16 -0.07*** 0.23 0.22 -0.03 0.25 
infraq4 0.36 0.40 0.12*** 0.28 0.30 0.04* 0.26 
Age at first migration     31.64 -0.01 31.65 
EU     0.08 -0.00 0.08 
CIS     0.14 -0.23*** 0.37 
Other     0.79 0.23*** 0.56 
Urban destination      0.32 0.02 0.30 
Illegal exp.     0.25 -0.00 0.25 
Illegal entry     0.21 0.00 0.21 
Illegal first job     0.27 0.02 0.26 
Language not spoken     0.17 0.04* 0.13 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.15 
 
27 
 
Details on regional development data 
The dataset on regional development in Moldova used in this paper comes from Roscovan and Galer (2006), 
who constructed three summary indicators: the economic, social and infrastructure development indexes. The social 
development index (SDI) combines measures of: 1) number of physicians per 10000 inhabitants, 2) number of 
hospital beds per 10000 inhabitants; 3) number of infant deaths per 1000 live births; 4) number of students per teacher. 
The infrastructure development index (IDI) includes: 1) number of cars in private ownership per 1000 inhabitants; 2) 
dwelling stock per inhabitant; 3) public passenger transportation; 4) number of telephones per 100 inhabitants; 5) 
length of public roads per inhabitant; 6) length of water piping per inhabitant; 7) length of sewerage system per 
inhabitant. The economic development index (EDI), which we use to test hypothesis 2b, encompasses: 1) average 
nominal monthly salary per employee; 2) volume of industrial and agricultural production per inhabitant; 3) volume of 
services per inhabitant; 4) number of SMEs per inhabitant; 5) rate of urbanization.  
All three indexes are normalized. The zero value of each index corresponds to the average national level of 
development. A positive (negative) value for each index corresponds to a region with higher (lower) level of 
development than the national average. The economic indicator ranges from -1.06 to 2, the social development index 
from -1.62 to 5, and the infrastructure development index from -1.59 to 1.3. For all three indicators, the highest 
possible value indicates the maximum development level (reference level), corresponding to the Chisinau (capital of 
Moldova) region and the Balti region. These indexes are correlated: coefficients of correlation are 69% between EDI 
and SDI, 77% between EDI and IDI, and 63% between SDI and IDI.  
 
Table 2a: Distribution of the Moldovan administrative-territorial units stratified by level of development for each 
summary indicator, 2004. 
Indexes  Mean SD Min Max Nbr of obs. 
Economic development index 0.06 0.78     -1.06          2.0 35 
Social development index 0.26 1.34 -1.63 5.0 35 
Infrastructure development index 0.04 0.67 -1.59 1.3 35 
Source: Roscovan and Galer (2006). 
 
For the econometric analysis, we classified the 35 administrative-territorial units according to level of development. A 
region is considered as depressed if it scores below zero on one of the corresponding indexes (zero being the average 
national level). It is considered as developed if the index is higher than zero and different from the reference level, 
corresponding to the two principal city regions of Moldova. We hence generate three dummies for each index 
according to this classification.  
 
Table 3a. Distribution of regional development indexes in the regression sample on duration of migration (939 
individuals) 
 Economic development index Social development index Infrastructure development index 
Level of development  Freq.% Freq.% Freq.% 
developed regions 27 19 25 
depressed regions 49 53 49 
reference region 24 28 26 
Total 100 100 100 
 
